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Abstract 
We look at an industry of Cournot oligopolists each of which consists of production 
facilities which enjoy some degree of freedom in deciding their output quantities and 
that way influence the total output of a firm. This structure can be motivated e.g. the 
existence of profit centers or by the specifics of a cooperative firm. The extent of coor-
dination inside the firms is captured in a simple way, and market equilibrium is derived 
for potentially asymmetric firms using the concept of a replacement function. We use 
this model to address the question of profitability of horizontal mergers and of the wel-
fare consequences of such mergers. Contrary to the standard literature, we find a wide 
range of potentially profitable mergers without having to refer to cost synergies. This 
result is driven by the effect of size in terms of the number of production facilities and 
by the strategic consequences of intra-firm decentralization. A number of seemingly 
conflicting results from the literature can be considered special cases of our model. 
Key words: merger, oligopoly, organization, vertical coordination 
 
JEL classification: L22, L13 
1 Introduction 
Following the seminal work of Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) there has been a 
long debate in theoretical industrial economics about the profitability of horizontal 
mergers in Cournot oligopolies. Basically, theorists find it hard to identify sound eco-
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nomic reasons for such mergers.1 According to Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) 
horizontal mergers which do not generate economies of scale or scope are only profit-
able if all or almost all competitors merge. Later work identified a number of – rather 
specific – conditions under which horizontal mergers could be profitable for the firms 
participating. Sufficient convexity of costs, for example, can guarantee economic bene-
fits from a bilateral horizontal merger (Perry and Porter 1985). Farrell and Shapiro 
(1990) looked at synergies as a necessary condition for profitable mergers. Cheung 
(1992) and Faulí-Oller (1997) analyzed mergers using more general forms of the de-
mand function and showed that mergers may be profitable if the combined market share 
of insiders exceeds 50%. More recently, Huck, Konrad and Müller (2001) examined 
mergers in a Stackelberg framework, finding out that a merger between a leader and a 
follower is beneficial. Gonzalez-Maestre and López-Cunat (2001) and Neus (2002) con-
sidered the role of strategic management compensation for the profitability of mergers. 
Moreover, Ziss (2001) analyzed mergers with strategic delegation and compensation 
schemes. 
In this paper we look at mergers from yet another angle: We model oligopolistic firms 
as consisting of several production facilities (called “factories” or “profit centers”) 
which may enjoy some scope for deciding their outputs and thereby influencing the to-
tal output of a firm. It turns out that the degree of (de-)centralization in such firms is a 
crucial determinant for the oligopoly equilibrium, and it also has important conse-
quences for the profitability of mergers in an industry consisting of such firms. Recent 
work of Creane and Davidson (2004), who also stress the role of internal organization, 
can be considered a special case of our analysis. These authors emphasize that a merger 
offers possibilities of strategic organization which cannot be implemented by separated 
firms. They argue that in the new firm there may be a pecking order inside the firm con-
sisting of divisions which were formerly independent firms. Creane and Davidson 
model this hierarchy between the divisions in a Stackelberg framework inside the firm. 
As a result, mergers may be profitable, if not too many firms participate. In contrast to 
the models mentioned above, a profitable merger hurts outsiders, and welfare increases. 
This is consistent with Levin (1990) who finds that mergers including less than 50 per-
cent of the total market raise welfare.  
Our research and our approach were motivated initially by our theoretical thinking 
about cooperatives. A marketing cooperative, for example, can be considered an ex-
tremely decentralized firm, where members produce whatever quantity they choose, and 
the cooperative sells these outputs in the market. In such a framework the interaction of 
members becomes important for the conduct of the cooperative as a whole. It is then 
interesting to know how such a decentralized firm interacts with a vertically integrated 
firm with centralized decision making. Higl (2003) generalizes an approach of Albæk 
and Schultz (1998) to this kind of competition. In a duopoly framework he highlights 
the strategically motivated choice of an optimal level of (de-)centralization. In the pre-
                                                 
1 We mention only in passing that the empirical literature also expresses a considerable scepticism 
towards the mergers that managers seem to pursue with a lot of money and management capacity. At 
least 50% of all mergers seem to face a negative judgement ex post despite all the euphoria ex ante. 
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sent paper we extend this previous work in several directions: 1. We treat firms as being 
on a continuum of different organisational forms, from perfect vertical integration to no 
central decision making at all. 2. We look at an oligopoly. 3. We analyze mergers and 
the relationship between internal organization in the sense of coordination of the pro-
duction facilities and the profitability of such mergers. 4. We use the technique of a re-
placement function as initially suggested by Selten (1970, 1973) and more recently 
propagated by Cornes and Hartley (2000, 2003) as a simple and elegant tool for analyz-
ing an oligopoly with asymmetric firms. This turns out to be particularly helpful, if we 
want to allow for firms with different organizational structures and different sizes in 
terms of the number of factories. 
Our main result is that the range of profitable mergers can be much larger than de-
scribed by Salant, Switzer und Reynolds (1983) once size (number of factories) and in-
tra-firm organization (extent of decentralization) are taken into account. In a way our 
paper is a complement to Perry and Porter (1985) in that it allows that a merged firm 
may differ in size from other firms. In addition, we model the extent of coordination 
within a firm in a simple and stylized way.  
The plan of the paper is as follows: In section 2 we present the basic model, introduce 
the idea of a replacement function, and derive the equilibrium of the asymmetric Cour-
not oligopoly. Section 3 deals with the analysis of mergers in this industry. In section 4 
we sum up. 
2 Basic Model 
We consider an oligopoly of K  firms indexed by 1, ,k K= K , producing a homogene-
ous good and competing in quantities. Each firm consists of kn  identical production 
facilities 1, ,k ki n= K  which we also call factories. We treat the number of factories as 
given. In such a vertical structure different degrees of integration and centralized deci-
sion making may exist. Imagine the case of a perfectly vertically integrated firm where 
output quantities of all factories are set by headquarters. As the opposite extreme case 
think of a firm where each factory is free to determine its production quantity. A mar-
keting cooperative, where members produce and the cooperative just takes to the market 
whatever quantities its members supply, is an example for this case of virtually no ver-
tical integration. Grosskopf (1990, p. 37) mentions the right to produce and sell to the 
cooperative at will as a prime motive for joining a cooperative. Usually, the different 
entities of a firm will enjoy some decision rights on their own while being coordinated 
by a centralized planning unit in other parts of their business. E.g., the organizational 
structure and the accounting procedures in profit centers stress the responsibility of each 
unit. In the sequel, the term “factory” should not be taken too literally. We can also 
imagine a financial services firm, like a bank, where branches decide on loans, or bond, 
or currency traders decide on buying financial assets for the firm. They will typically 
enjoy a certain degree of freedom for their “production” decisions. In our framework we 
want to capture the whole continuum between the two extreme cases of fully centralized 
decision making and totally decentralized decision making and find out whether this 
aspect of internal organization, i.e., the degree of production autonomy on the factory 
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level, has an impact on the profitability of mergers. A coordination parameter will be 
used to represent different degrees of centralization in our model. 
Firm k  receives quantity iky  from its factory ki  and sells it in its oligopolistic market. 
Notice that we could also interpret the iky ’s as an intermediate product which producer 
k  turns into a final product and sells. In this case we would be using the simplifying 
assumption that one unit of the intermediate product is transformed into one unit of the 
final product. Total output of firm k  is then given by 
 
1
kn
k ik
i
Y y
=
= ∑ , (1) 
total industry output is the sum over all firm output 
 
1
K
k
k
Y Y
=
= ∑  (2) 
Demand for the homogeneous product is modelled in the most simple way as Yp −=1 . 
Production on the factory level causes a constant unit and marginal cost c , where we 
assume 10 ≤≤ c . Costs in headquarters (or for producing the final product) are normal-
ized to zero to keep the model and its notation as simple as possible. 
Consider now the internal structure and decisions of a firm in more detail:  
We think of firm k ’s factories as individually setting their output quantities. Behaving 
this way, production facility ki  to some extent takes into account the behaviour of k ’s 
other factories. We can interpret this either as some degree of control by headquarters or 
as factory ki  looking beyond its own, narrow area of immediate responsibility. A fac-
tory’s behaviour can be influenced or controlled for example with production quotas, 
distribution of decision competences or with an internal compensation scheme. No mat-
ter which interpretation we use, the level of coordination will be modelled in a stylized 
fashion by a simple coordination parameter.  
Production facilities are rewarded by firm k  in two different ways, First, they receive a 
price kp  for the product which may, as you recall, be interpreted as intermediate prod-
uct. Second, they receive a share of the firm’s profit. Because we focus on the role of 
the individual factory, it will be useful for comparisons to assume that all profits are 
distributed to the factories. We offer two interpretations for this profit distribution im-
plying the same structure of the theoretical analysis: one, capturing in a stylized way the 
notion of a cooperative firm, and another, referring to strategic compensation schemes 
in business. 
First, we assume that production facilities get a share of the firm’s profit in relation to 
the number of output units they supply. This is the most natural reward scheme in the 
case of a cooperative, but would also fit quite well the examples from financial services 
mentioned above. If the price in the oligopolistic market of the K  firms is p , costs at 
the firm level are zero, and factories are rewarded as described, production facility ki  
receives a price ikp  for one unit of its output, which is equal to the equilibrium price in 
the oligopoly 
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where kΠ  denotes firm k ’s profit. Each production facility ki  maximizes a profit func-
tion 
 ( )1ik ik ik k k ik ikpy cy Y Y y cyπ −= − = − − − , (4) 
where kY−  is equal to the sum of all of k ’s competitors’ outputs lY , l k≠ , i.e., 
l kY Y Y= − . The notion of each factory maximizing its own profit ikπ  again represents 
the idea that these units enjoy some degree of independence and/or face an incentive 
scheme based on their own economic success. Maximization with respect to iky  re-
quires 
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We assume that the K  oligopolists play a Cournot game and decision makers in all 
production facilities are aware of this fact. This implies 0k kdY dY− =  and simplifies the 
first-order condition (5) accordingly. 
We now introduce a parameter 
 
1
kn
jkk
k
jik ik
dydY
dy dy
γ
=
= = ∑  (6) 
which expresses the change of firm k ’s total output corresponding to a change in the 
output of factory ki  as expected by this factory’s decision maker. Using kγ  we can re-
write the first-order condition (5) as 
 01 =−−−− − cyYY ikkkk γ  (7) 
kγ  can be seen as capturing the degree of central decision making in firm k  in a styl-
ized way and is therefore interpreted as a measure of internal organization.  
Before we look at the influence of kγ  in detail, we show that this parameter is consis-
tent with an incentive-based compensation scheme. Assume, a production facility gets 
its internal transfer price based on firm revenue and output: 
 ikk
k
k
ik ygY
pYp +=  (8) 
For budget balance of the firm, the factory pays a fixed internal transfer fee T . A fac-
tory therefore maximizes  
 ikikikkKKik cyTyygYY −−+−−= − )1(π  (9) 
Using the Cournot assumption 0,1 == − ikKikK dydYdydY , the first-order condition is 
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 0)21(1 =−−−−− − cygYY ikkKK  (10) 
A comparison to (7) shows that the coordination parameter kγ  introduced before can 
also be used in the model with the incentive scheme by replacing )21( kg−  with kγ .2 
Let us now take a closer look at the values of the coordination parameter. k knγ = , for 
example, represents a situation where production facilities behave in a perfectly parallel 
way. All the effects of their actions on the firm’s output are taken into account. This is 
the case of a fully vertically integrated firm. A value of 0kγ =  stands for a situation 
where a single production facility believes to have no influence at all on total output of 
the firm. Therefore the factory expects that the price p  will remain unchanged as it 
changes iky . This is like a situation of optimally adjusting to a given price, since opti-
mal behaviour now calls for p c= . Production facilities act as if they were under per-
fect competition in the market for the final product. Hybrid cases exist for kγ  between 
the two extreme values, i.e. for 0 k knγ< < . For 1kγ = , for example, a factory is only 
aware of the impact of its own output on total output. It neglects any (re-) actions from 
the other factories of firm k .3  
For our further analysis of the model a normalization of the organization or coordina-
tion parameter kγ  turns out to be helpful. We therefore introduce 
 kk
kn
γΓ =  (11) 
which is defined on the interval [0,1]  given that we confine our interest to [0, ]k knγ ∈ . 
1kΓ =  describes perfect vertical integration, 0kΓ =  full autonomy of the production 
facilities. kΓ  is a measure of centralization or coordination within the firm, expressing 
the ratio of coordination per factory. (1 )k− Γ  represents the degree of autonomy the 
factories enjoy.4  
Since all factories of a firm are identical, we have 1 :k ik nk ky y y y= = = = =K K  and 
k k kY n y= .5 A representative factory’s best reply then is (1 ) ( )k k k ky c Y n γ−= − − + , 
implying  
 ( )1 1
1
k k k
k
k k k
n c Y c YY
n γ
− −− − − −= =+ + Γ  (12) 
                                                 
2  The second order condition 1<kg  holds for all expected values of kγ . 
3  This corresponds to the case analyzed by Albæk and Schultz (1998) in a model of duopolistic competi-
tion between a cooperative and an investor-owned firm. 
4  There is clearly a formal resemblance of this parameter of intra-firm coordination and the concept of 
conjectural variations in the theoretical literature on oligopoly (see e.g. Martin, 2002). Dixit (1986) 
suggested to treat conjectures as proxies for different kinds of oligopolistic interactions. Similarly, we 
want to use the kγ ’s here as parameters capturing the extent of internal coordination in the firm in the 
most simple way. 
5  Notice that the degree of internal organization may differ between firms, as does the number of pro-
duction facilities. 
7 
as best reply function of firm k  in the oligopoly. Notice that decentralization -  a lower 
kΓ  - makes the firm more aggressive in the sense of standard oligopoly theory. 6 
This is an insight which corresponds to results by Fershtman (1985), Fershtman and 
Judd (1987), and Sklivas (1987) who had shown that employing a manager and giving 
him an objective function different from the owner’s makes a Cournot duopolist more 
aggressive. Whereas in this earlier literature a manager’s “autonomy” was expressed by 
an objective function deviating from pure profit-maximizing (by putting a non-zero 
weight on sales), in our case a factory’s autonomy can also concern its expected influ-
ence on total firm output because of the distribution of decision rights inside the firm. 
Notice that our specification of kγ  in the incentive scheme for the factories (8) directly 
corresponds to this literature: For 1=kγ , i.e., 0=kg , the factories are rewarded solely 
on the basis of their revenues. For lower values of kγ  ( 02/1 >> kg ) they behave more 
aggressively getting an extra reward on sales, while for a higher kγ  ( 0<kg ) they are 
less aggressive. The latter corresponds to an objective function combining revenue and 
profit as used e.g. in Fershtman and Judd (1987). Notice that the pecking order model 
of Creane and Davidson (2004) can also be integrated into our approach. Leaders (L) 
inside the firm have a coordination parameter  
( )1 kF kLk
kL
dr Y
dY
γ = +  
which is influenced by the reaction of the followers (F) inside the firm to the leaders’ 
output decisions. In case of competition in quantities the reaction function has a nega-
tive slope, and therefore 1<kγ , i.e., the firm behaves more aggressively in the frame-
work of Creane and Davidson (2004).  
Now we analyze the oligopoly using Selten’s (1970,1973) notion of a replacement func-
tion which has become popular only recently through work of Cornes and Hartley 
(2000, 2003). The replacement function is a useful tool to solve for the Nash equilib-
rium of an oligopoly of asymmetric firms.  
Inserting the definition of kY−  into (12) and solving for kY  yields the replacement func-
tion of firm k  as 
 1 (1 )k
k
Y Y c= − −Γ  (13) 
This indicates that at a lower level of intra-firm coordination the firm will produce a 
higher output relative to industry output. 1kΓ = , which indicates perfect vertical inte-
gration, implies the lowest output, 0kΓ →  the highest. We introduce 
 1 [1, ]kk
k k
nM γ= = ∈ ∞Γ  (14) 
as an indicator of firm k ’s production exceeding the level 1 Y c− −  of the perfectly 
vertically integrated firm. This surplus production occurs because the kn  production 
                                                 
6  Higl (2003) interpreted this insight in the context of strategic moves. 
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facilities of firm k  do not fully internalize the external effects of their output decisions 
if k knγ < . The degree of the surplus production is influenced by size and organizational 
structure of the firm. 
Summing up the K  replacement functions leads to  
 
1
(1 )
K
k
k
Y M Y c
=
= − −∑  (15) 
and to a Cournot-Nash equilibrium output 
 (1 )
1
M cY
M
−= + , (16) 
where M  is defined as 
 
1
K
k
k
M M
=
= ∑  (17) 
[ [∞∈ ,KM  is then a multiplicative measure of excess production of the whole industry 
over an oligopoly with perfectly integrated firms. Under perfect integration M  equals 
K . Solving for the other equilibrium values, we get 
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2
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1
1
1
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1
1
1
1

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c
n
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cMY
M
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kk
k
k
k
kk
π  (18) 
where because of the symmetry of the factories we used kπ  instead of ikπ  to denote a 
single production facility’s equilibrium profit level.  
Notice an interesting property of the equilibrium solution which will be useful for fur-
ther interpretations: The weight of a single firm kM  in the industry’s total surplus pro-
duction indicated by M  corresponds to the firm’s market share in equilibrium: 
 
Y
Y
M
M kk =  (19) 
We are now in a position to use these results to take a look at mergers in this industry of 
firms with potentially differing degrees of internal coordination. 
3 Merger Analysis 
The base model presented and developed in the previous section can be applied to ana-
lyze merger in this industry. At least since the seminal work of Salant, Switzer and Rey-
nolds (1983), industrial economists have had a hard time finding and understanding 
reasons for horizontal mergers to be advantageous. Horizontal mergers which do not 
generate economies of scale or scope are only profitable if all or almost all competitors 
merge. Only sufficient convexity of costs can guarantee economic benefits from a bilat-
9 
eral horizontal merger (Perry and Porter 1985). Many of the arguments of this debate 
about the “merger puzzle” can be found e.g. in Scherer (2002) or Neus (2002). What we 
want to do here is examine the impact of the internal structure of merging firms on the 
profitability of a merger. It turns out that horizontal mergers become more attractive 
than previously suggested by the standard results in the literature. 
We now modify our notation slightly. Firms 1, ,f F= K , F K≤  are the ones which 
participate in a horizontal merger, whereas firms 1, ,k F K= + K  do not merge and re-
main independent oligopolists. We call the newly merged firm producer *F  which now 
competes in a ( 1)K F− + -firm oligopoly. The merged firm absorbs all factories of the 
participating merging firms, i.e., 7 
 ∑
=
=
F
f
fF nn
1
*  (20) 
With regard to internal organization, the newly merged firm *F  chooses a new level of 
coordination *Fγ . Mergers typically create opportunities to reorganize the merging 
firms. The structure is adapted to the new circumstances, for example processes are re-
examined and often reorganized, but also production targets and quotas are set anew. 
Objectives and incentives inside the merged firm may differ from the ones used before 
merger.  
As in most of the literature, we ignore potential cost effects of the merger, thereby con-
sidering a reference case. Instead, we focus on the impact of size – number of facto-
ries – and internal organization – degree of coordination of the factories – on the equi-
librium.  
If F  firms merge, the factor M  which affects all equilibrium values changes to *M : 
 * * *
1 1
1F F
f F f
f f F
M M M M M M
= =
= − + = − + Γ∑ ∑  (21) 
* * *
F F FnγΓ =  is influenced both by the aggregate number of factories which we assume 
to be unaffected by the merger, and by the newly merged firm’s level of internal coor-
dination *Fγ  which it is free to choose at the occasion of the merger. For ease of notation 
we denote the aggregated parameters fM  of the F merging firms (the “insiders”) by 
IM . 
If the new firm *F  adapts a very decentralized structure, *M M> . With a more cen-
tralized organization we get *M M< . Let M∆  denote the change in M  as result of the 
merger, i.e., 
 ∑∑
=
= −=−=∆
F
f f
f
F
F
f
f
IF
n
n
MMM
1
*
1*
γγ  (22) 
                                                 
7  We do not claim that mergers will necessary leave the number of factories unchanged. However, 
since we are interested in the consequences of internal coordination, we treat the number of factories 
as given. Especially in case of cooperatives it seems plausible, that the total number of members re-
mains unchanged.  
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Figure 1 exhibits the consequences of re-organizing a newly merged firm.  
*
FΓ1
M
1
F
f
f
M M
=
−∑
*M
1
[ [∞+ ,1F
 
Figure 1: Impact of re-organization on *M  
We can now illustrate some stylized cases of mergers: 
? Merger between F  perfectly vertically integrated firms ( 1fM = , 1, ,f F= K ) 
which create one new such firm. This is the typical case examined in the theoretical 
literature on horizontal mergers (see e.g. Salant, Switzer  and Reynolds 1983). It im-
plies 1 0M F∆ = − < . 
? Merger of F  firms the production facilities of which initially have the same coordi-
nation parameter ( 1 Fγ γ= =K ) and still use the same parameter after the merger 
( *F Fγ γ= ). This will leave M  unchanged:  
 1
1
0
F
f F
f f
fF F
n
n
M γ γ
=
=
∆ = − =
∑ ∑  (23) 
This should not be interpreted as keeping the old kind of organization in place. In-
stead, this only says that factories in the new, larger firm expect the same aggregate 
output reaction as before in a smaller, pre-merger firm. Notice that the merged firm 
indeed has a new parameter *F F FnγΓ =  which is below the parameter of each of 
the merging firms. 
? Merger of F  firms having identical f fnγ  ( 1 FΓ = = ΓK ). These firms then also 
had identical pre-merger factors fM . Firms with identical numbers of factories in 
this setting have the same level of internal coordination, firms with a lower (higher) 
number of factories are more decentralized (centralized) in their output decisions. 
For the change in M  we get 
 *
1
F F
FM∆ = −Γ Γ  (24) 
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 which may be greater or less than zero. More specifically,  
 
*
*
*
0 if
0 if
0 if
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
M F
F
 Γ< < Γ Γ∆ = = Γ Γ> > Γ
 (25) 
 If the merger leads to a strong increase in decentralization, M  will rise.  
? Merger between only two firms (firms 1 and 2) with 1 1 2 2n nγ γ≠  ( 1 2Γ ≠ Γ ) where 
the merged firm adopts one of the two initial structures, e.g. firm 1’s, 
 
1 1 2
1 1 1 0M∆ = − − <Γ Γ Γ  (26) 
No matter which organizational structure is chosen, M  will be lower after the 
merger.  
To summarize, we state that in most cases a merger will be followed by a reduction in 
M . There are, however, exceptions if the merger coincides with a strong increase in 
decentralized decision making.  
Let us now use our stylized representation of intra-firm organization and of mergers in 
an oligopolistic sector and look for implications of mergers for outsiders, i.e., firms not 
participating, insiders, and factories of the insiders. Recall that in the classical paper by 
Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) outsiders always benefit from a merger, whereas 
insiders can only benefit, if almost the whole industry merges. 
From (16) and the equilibrium price presented in (18) we know that Y  and p  in the 
market are only influenced by M  for given cost and demand conditions. If a merger 
leads to a lower M  ( 0M∆ < ) which we consider the most likely case, output will de-
crease and price will go up: 
 ( ) ( )2 2
1 10 0
1 1
dY c dp c
dM dMM M
− −= > = − <+ +  (27) 
If, however, M  remains unchanged in a merger, there will be no price and output 
change. An increase of M corresponds to a significantly more decentralized firm, imply-
ing a welfare increase as result of the merger as in Levin (1990).  
If we look at outsiders, i.e., at those firms 1, ,k F K= + K  which do not participate in 
the merger, we see that they are affected by a change in M , despite the fact that their 
internal parameters kγ , kn  and kM  remain the same. A factory ki  of an outsider firm k  
faces a profit change 
 ( )( )
2
3
2 1
0, 1, ,
1
k
k
c
k F K
M M
π
γ
−∂ = − < = +∂ + K  (28) 
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as result of the merger of firms 1, , FK . This can immediately be aggregated into a 
statement on the profit of firm k  as a whole. For 0M∆ <  this is in line with the Salant, 
Switzer and Reynolds (1983) result. For a merger leading to significant decentralization 
( 0M∆ > ), however, outsiders may suffer from the merger, because the new firm under 
its loose organizational structure floods the market with additional output.  
Turning to insiders, i.e., the firms 1, ,f F= K  participating in the merger, we first take 
a look at the firms themselves, before we compare their profits to those of the outsiders. 
In order to evaluate the profitability of a merger, we compare the profit of the merged 
firm F  *FΠ  to the sum of all pre-merger profits fΠ , 1, ,f F= K .8 The change in profit 
is given by 
 ( ) ( ) ( )
*
2 1*
2 2
1
1
1 1
F
fF
fF
F F f
f
M
Mc
M M M
=
=
   ∆Π = Π − Π = − − + + ∆ +  
∑∑  (29) 
which after inserting (22) can be written as 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) 



+−−++−=∆Π 22*
*
2
11
1
M
M
MMM
Mc I
If
F
F  (30) 
Inspection of this term shows that a merger is profitable ( 0F∆Π > ), if the merged 
firm’s structural parameter *FΓ  is between the two bounds defined by 
 * *1F F I
I
M M
M
Γ = ⇔ =  (31) 
and 
 
( )
*
2
*
if 1
1
1 else
I
F
I
F
M
M M
 Γ < + −Γ = 
 (32) 
The change in profit reaches its maximum for  
 
I
F MM −+=Γ 1
1~*  (33) 
                                                 
8  We do not consider issues of distribution of profits within the new firm. There can be a conflict be-
tween merger profitability from the perspective of headquarters and merger profitability as seen from 
the angle of a factory manager (or member of a marketing cooperative). I.e., a merger can be benefi-
cial for the merged firm and still be disadvantageous for the production facilities of some merging 
firms due to different organisational structures and size. Without side payments, production facilities 
having a lot of control like members of cooperatives will prevent a merger. We call a merger profit-
able if gains for all factories can be implemented by redistribution of profits.  
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By choosing *FΓ , i.e., its degree of (de-)centralization, appropriately, the newly merged 
firm can ensure the economic success of the horizontal merger. Lack of consideration 
for the internal organization of firms can therefore be considered one more reason why 
the Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) result is too pessimistic about the profitability 
of a horizontal merger. Mergers can be made profitable even without synergies. 
Notice some important implications of our analysis: 
The profitable area where 0>∆Π F  is influenced by the total production multiplier M  
and the weight of insiders IM  and outsiders )( IMM − .  
A closer look at the bounds (31) and (32) shows, that at *FΓ , M remains unchanged, i.e. 
0=∆M . The second bound *FΓ  coincides with *FΓ  and *~FΓ  at 
 
2
1 MM I
+=  (34) 
Using (19), this can be rearranged to 
 
MY
YI
2
1
2
1 +=  (35) 
The results differ depending on the initial market share YYI /  of the merging firms. The 
“critical” market share (35) of these firms depends on excess production M  as previ-
ously defined. For low values of M the critical value is high, for “wide” markets it con-
verges to 50 percent.  
If the initial market share of the merging firms is sufficiently high, 
*
FΓ  is the upper 
bound of the profitable area. Profitable mergers then go along with less aggregate out-
put, i.e., 0<∆M . From (28) we know that in this case outsiders will also enjoy gains 
from the merger. 
If the market share of the merging firms is lower than (35), 
*
FΓ  is smaller than *FΓ . In 
this case, a profitable merger implies 0>∆M . The merged firm floods the market and 
gains additional profits at the expense of outsiders, while consumer surplus rises. 
(33) implies that perfect vertical integration is only optimal for a monopoly. The smaller 
the merging firms’ share of the total market (measured by M ), the more decentralized 
their decision making ought to be.  
We also observe that the lower bound is always greater than zero. A behaviour of facto-
ries analogous to price-taking can therefore never be optimal. It always pays to intro-
duce some extent of coordination. 
There are two potential reasons for mergers to be beneficial from the insiders’ perspec-
tive: First, for mergers reducing aggregate output significantly, coordination within the 
firm is advantageous. Second, for small-scale mergers increased decentralization can 
induce a more aggressive behaviour, leading to a defensive reaction of competitors and 
to a higher profit. If we look at Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983), we only find the 
first effect because they do not consider the internal structure of firms. If we assume 
only perfectly vertically integrated firms, i.e., 1kΓ = , M K= , and FM I = , in our 
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model, we get the same condition for a profitable merger as Salant, Switzer  and Rey-
nolds (1983) which is ( ) ( )2 21 2K K F F+ > + − .  
If a firm is perfectly vertically integrated, under our assumption of constant marginal 
costs its behaviour is not affected by the number of production facilities. However, if 
factories have their own say in production decisions and can affect total output of the 
firm, their number matters. This effect becomes stronger, as the number of production 
facilities rises: *FM  increases in 
*
Fn  for 
* 1FΓ < . There is an advantage to size which 
creates a motivation for mergers. Mergers are therefore more often profitable than sug-
gested by the model of Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983). For all parameter constella-
tions a potential for the merged firm to generate a profit higher than the aggregate of 
pre-merger profits by choosing an appropriate level of decentralization exists.  
We conclude that mergers which are mainly driven by the desire to create market power 
in the traditional sense can be beneficial for both insiders and outsiders. The more 
mergers take into account the strategic effects of decentralization, the more insiders will 
benefit at the expense of outsiders. 
Let us now compare outsiders to insiders. The literature suggests, that outsiders are al-
ways better off than participating firms. The result is driven by the fact, that in Cournot 
oligopoly merging firms lower their output, while outsiders react with a (smaller) output 
increase (Farrell and Shapiro 1990, p. 111). In our model a second force operates in 
favour of insiders: With reorganization the merged firm can adjust to the new market 
conditions and may gain at the expense of outsiders due to a strategic effect.  
To compare the profit consequences, we assume that the new firm chooses its optimal 
organizational level *~FΓ . Inserting (33) in (29) yields 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )I
I
F MMM
MMc
−++
−+−=Π∆
114
211~
2
22
 (36) 
The profitability of a merger for insiders is shown for a given M by the bold line in fig-
ure 2.  
The difference between outsiders’ aggregate profits before and after the merger is 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) 



+
−−∆++
−∆+−=∆Π 22
*
2
11
1
M
MM
MM
MMMc IFK  (37) 
From (33) and (22) we get 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
2 2
1 11
2 2 2 1K I I
c M M
M M M
 ∆Π = − − −  + − + 
%  (38) 
The profitability for outsiders *K∆Π  for a given M is represented by the dashed line in 
figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Profitability of mergers depending on the weight of the merging firms  
Insiders’ and outsiders’ profits depend on the initial market shares of the merging firms. 
For  
 MMMM I 454
1
4
3
2
1 +−+≤≤+  (39) 
 1 3 5 41
2 4 4
IM Y M
M Y M M
+ +⇔ ≤ ≤ + −  (40) 
profit gains of outsiders exceed insiders’ advantages. 
From (34) we know that at the lower bound of (39) M remains constant. Below, i.e., 
when mergers include a smaller market share, we already know that the merger takes 
place at the expense of outsiders.  
If IM  exceeds the lower bound, outsiders always gain from merger. Their advantages 
exceed insiders’ profit gains unless almost the whole market merges, i.e., the weight of 
merging firms exceeds the upper bound of (39).  
To explain these results consider the two antipodal effects of a merger: output effects 
due to concentration, i.e. a lower number of firms after the merger, and decentralization 
due to reorganization. Between the two bounds (39) the concentration effect which is in 
favour of outsiders overcompensates the effect due to decentralization of the new firm. 
In the other cases, the new firm will gain additional profits due to the strategic effect of 
decentralization accompanied by disadvantages for outsiders.  
Figure 3 summarizes our results and relates them graphically to important contributions 
in the literature. We have shown that a merger can always be profitable, if the new firm 
chooses an appropriate organizational design. Moreover, we are able to identify winners 
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and losers of a merger. Market size and market share of merging firms are crucial for 
these results: For a “big” merger (i.e., mergers in the areas I, II, and III of the diagram) 
all firms gain, while consumer surplus and total welfare decline. “Small” mergers, i.e., 
mergers in sectors IV and V, are welfare increasing at the expense of outsiders. Notice 
that mergers located in sector V are the ones identified as profitable by Creane and 
Davidson (2004) due to increased aggressiveness of the merged firm. For the regions 
labeled II and III in figure 3 outsiders will be better off. We also find a region of “large” 
mergers, where insiders are better off, denoted by I in figure 3. Notice that for the merg-
ers in region I which are considered profitable as in the model of Salant, Switzer and 
Reynolds (1983) (SSR), we conclude that insiders gain more than outsiders which which 
differs from the standard SSR result. In figure 3 profitable mergers in sense of Salant, 
Switzer and Reynolds can be found in sectors I and II.  
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00~~ <∆>Π∆>Π∆ MFK
0~0~ >∆Π∆>>Π∆ MKF
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Figure 3: Profitability of mergers depending on of initial market share of merging firms  
We conclude that the effects of a merger depend crucially of the choice of internal or-
ganization. Horizontal mergers can always be made profitable. By an appropriate choice 
of internal coordination. However, the extent of profitability and the relation of insid-
ers’ to outsiders’ profits also depends on the size of a merger. This suggests an analysis 
of endogenous mergers which is beyond the scope of our present paper. It is apparent 
that outsiders in regions I, IV, and V of figure 3 have a strong incentive to join the 
merger, while in II and III insiders would rather leave the merger project. An analysis of 
endogenous mergers requires additional assumptions about the way mergers are created 
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and about the informational structure of the game involved.9 These questions will be left 
to further work.  
4 Conclusion 
We looked at the vertical structure of oligopolistic firms which may differ in size and in 
their intra-firm coordination of output decisions. Perfect vertical integration in this 
framework is not optimal from a strategic point of view. Nor is full decentralization. 
The optimal level of decentralization is to be found somewhere in-between at hybrid 
organizational forms. The model of asymmetric oligopolistic firms with a vertical struc-
ture was used to analyze mergers of any number of firms in an industry. Our results are 
driven by a strategic effect of a higher number of factories and of decentralization and 
by increased concentration in case of a merger. Using the concept of a replacement 
function as a tool to derive explicit equilibria for asymmetric oligopolies, we derived 
equilibrium values and evaluated the impact of a merger even if firms differed in their 
internal organization and/or size.  
Horizontal mergers turned out to be profitable under much more general conditions than 
usually presented in the literature. The extent of intra-firm coordination which we cap-
tured by a simple parameter turned out to be very important for the evaluation of a 
merger project. Decentralization tends to make a merger more profitable and allows for 
mergers of only a small number of firms which were not considered viable in the previ-
ous literature. Our results support rules in competition policy which allow small-scale 
mergers but prevent large-scale mergers. Furthermore, our analysis suggests that inter-
nal organization matters for the economic effects of a merger. Decentralized decision 
making in merged firms reduces the danger of negative welfare consequences. This 
supports special exemptions for cooperative firms.  
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